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Abstract—This work considers a line-of-sight underwater
acoustic sensor network (UWASN) consisting of M underwater
sensor nodes randomly deployed according to uniform distri-
bution within a vertical half-disc (the so-called trusted zone).
The sensor nodes report their sensed data to a sink node on
water surface on a shared underwater acoustic (UWA) reporting
channel in a time-division multiple-access (TDMA) fashion, while
an active-yet-invisible adversary (so-called Eve) is present in
the close vicinity who aims to inject malicious data into the
system by impersonating some Alice node. To this end, this work
first considers an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) UWA
channel, and proposes a novel, multiple-features based, two-step
method at the sink node to thwart the potential impersonation
attack by Eve. Specifically, the sink node exploits the noisy
estimates of the distance, the angle of arrival, and the location
of the transmit node as device fingerprints to carry out a
number of binary hypothesis tests (for impersonation detection)
as well as a number of maximum likelihood hypothesis tests (for
transmitter identification when no impersonation is detected). We
provide closed-form expressions for the error probabilities (i.e.,
the performance) of most of the hypothesis tests. We then consider
the case of a UWA with colored noise and frequency-dependent
pathloss, and derive a maximum-likelihood (ML) distance esti-
mator as well as the corresponding Cramer-Rao bound (CRB).
We then invoke the proposed two-step, impersonation detection
framework by utilizing distance as the sole feature. Finally, we
provide detailed simulation results for both AWGN UWA channel
and the UWA channel with colored noise. Simulation results
verify that the proposed scheme is indeed effective for a UWA
channel with colored noise and frequency-dependent pathloss.
I. INTRODUCTION
Underwater acoustic sensor networks (UWASN) are utilized
by a multitude of civilian and military applications, e.g.,
sensing a specific area for resources, intrusion detection for
border surveillance, and exploration of life underwater [1], [2].
In contrast to the terrestrial wireless networks, the UWASNs
are exposed to the peculiar challenges of the underwater
acoustic (UWA) channel, e.g. frequency-selective nature of
path-loss and ambient noise, severe multipath (longer delay
spreads), battery constraints, low (and variable) propagation
speed of acoustic waves, and low data rates (for long-range
communication) [1], [3]. The aforementioned challenges make
the UWA channel quite error-prone, which calls for design
of intelligent forward error correction (FEC) schemes, and
retransmission schemes (e.g. ARQ) [3] tailored for UWASNs.
The broadcast nature of the UWA channel also makes the
UWASNs vulnerable to various kinds of security breaches by
nearby malicious nodes. Traditionally, the broadcast channels
(e.g., terrestrial wireless, underwater acoustic) were secured
via cryptography-based solutions at higher layers, where mu-
tual trust is established a priori by pre-distributing a set of
shared secret keys among the network entities. Recently there
has been tremendous interest in complementing the crypto-
based security mechanisms at the higher layers with the
feature-based security mechanisms at the physical layer [4].
Physical-layer security schemes build upon the so-called fea-
tures (derived from the propagation medium’s characteristics,
or, hardware imperfections) to exploit them as virtual keys to
enforce an additional layer of security in the network [4], [5].
Various kinds of attacks by adversaries have been in-
vestigated in the literature—e.g., impersonation (or, intru-
sion) attacks, eavesdropping attacks, Sybil attacks, denial-of-
service attacks, wormhole attacks, jamming attacks, man-in-
the-middle attacks, and malicious relaying—and a detailed
survey of these attacks can be seen in the recent survey articles
[4], [6], [7]. Most importantly, each physical-layer security
scheme, like its higher layer counterpart, could counter only
certain attacks (and not all of them) while making certain a
priori assumptions about Eve (e.g., how much computational
and infrastructural resources are at the disposal of Eve), which
if violated by Eve renders the scheme ineffective [4], [5].
This work considers a UWASN whereby a set of M sensor
nodes reports its sensed data to a sink node (on the water
surface) in a time-division multiple access (TDMA) fashion,
while a malicious node Eve is present in the close vicinity. This
work assumes an active Eve. When Eve actively transmits,
it may either announce its presence by executing a jamming
attack, or it may remain in stealth mode to execute an
impersonation attack. This work assumes that Eve remains in
stealth mode only. That is, Eve—being a clever impersonator
and not a mere jammer—wants to deceive the sink node
by assuring it that Eve is indeed a legitimate sensor node.
This way, Eve could potentially inject malicious data into the
system to corrupt the system’s data integrity.
Contributions. The main contributions of this work are:
(C1) This work presents a novel, multiple-features based,
two-step method for impersonation detection in an additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN)-limited, line-of-sight UWA
channel. The first step implements a binary hypothesis test
to enforce a proximity-based authentication. To this end,
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2the sink node exploits the distance estimate of the sender
node to determine whether the transmit node lies within a
trusted zone (a half-disc of radius d0) or not. The second
step assumes that the sink node has the estimate of angle of
arrival (AoA), and thus, the estimate of sender node’s position
available. The estimates of distance, AoA, and position are
then exploited as fingerprints of the transmit device, and each
of them is passed on to a maximum likelihood test followed
by a binary hypothesis test. The individual binary decisions—
impersonation or no impersonation—of all the tests in the
second step are fused together (and the fusion outcome is
further fused with the binary decision from the first step) to
generate the ultimate binary decision.
(C2) As a by-product, the proposed method also performs
transmitter identification when no impersonation is detected in
the system.
(C3) Next, we relax the two main assumptions in (C1) that
the UWA channel is AWGN, and the distance estimate is
available to the sink node. Specifically, we first do explicit
(round-trip time based) maximum likelihood (ML) distance
estimation, and obtain the corresponding Cramer Rao bound
(CRB). We then invoke the (distance-based) impersonation
detection framework proposed in (C1) for a UWA channel
with colored noise and frequency-dependent pathloss.
Section II summarizes the prior art on security in UWASNs.
But, to the best of authors’ knowledge, a systematic treatment
of (network-wide) impersonation attack detection is missing in
the existing literature on UWASNs1.
Outline. The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II summarizes the selected related work. Section III
presents the system model and the UWA channel model.
Section IV proposes a novel, multiple-features based, two-
step method for impersonation detection in an AWGN UWA
channel. Section V obtains an explicit ML distance estimate
and the corresponding CRB to carry out (distance-based)
impersonation detection in a UWA channel with colored noise
and frequency-dependent pathloss. Extensive simulation re-
sults are provided in section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes
the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Security in UWASNs is a subject that has not yet received
much attention by the researchers so far. There are a few
review articles ( [6], [7], [8]) and a vision paper [9] though
which list various kinds of attacks which the malicious nodes
could launch against the UWASNs, and provide their own
take on design of futuristic secure UWASNs. The articles
[6]–[9] all admit that the security needs of UWSANs have
not been addressed to full extent, i.e., there are many kinds
of potential attacks (e.g. impersonation attack) for which
no prevention/counter mechanisms have been reported in the
literature. Nevertheless, the prior art on security in UWASNs
is briefly summarized below.
1The literature on physical layer security has mainly considered a very
simplistic model consisting of only three nodes (Alice, Bob and Eve) so
far [4], [5]. This work, however, considers a more practical scenario where
multiple Alice/sensor nodes report to a Bob/sink node. Therefore, we dub the
proposed method as capable of doing network-wide impersonation detection.
The works in [10], [11], [12] provide cryptographic solu-
tions to address the security needs of UWASNs. The authors of
[10] consider both eavesdropping attack and the impersonation
attack by the malicious node(s), and counter them by pre-
distributing to the UWASN members a group key (which
sensor nodes use to broadcast their sensed data to the group
members) and a session key (which the sensor nodes use to
send data to the sink node), while the sink node does the
key management (e.g., the key generation, key updating, etc.).
In [11], the same authors extend a well-known network dis-
covery protocol (where sensor nodes discover their neighbor
to develop routing tables), the so-called FLOOD protocol, to
protect the UWASN from the spoofing (impersonation) attacks
and denial-of-service attacks by intruders during the network
discovery phase. Specifically, the authors of [11] recommend
that each UWASN node should be provided a link key table
(a link key is the pairwise agreement/key between the two
neighboring nodes). Moreover, the neighboring nodes form
the clusters (a cluster is one collision domain) whereby all
the cluster members share a cluster key to communicate with
each other. Ateniese et al. [12] present various cryptographic
solutions for message encryption and authentication, i.e., gen-
eration of (block cipher based) symmetric keys, and (elliptic
curves based) asymmetric keys.
The works in [13], [14], [15] all consider jamming attacks
on UWASNs by active (and aggressive) intruders. The authors
of [13] propose to route the sensed data to the sink node(s) via
multiple paths (the so-called restricted flooding), which makes
the system jamming-resilient. Zuba et al. [14] conduct real-
time jamming experiments with commercial (Benthos) acous-
tic OFDM modems in Mansfield Hollow Lake (in Mansfield,
CT, USA) to demonstrate that jamming attacks could easily
lead to denial of service predicament in UWASNs. Xiao et
al. [15] utilize the tools from game theory to formulate the
hostile interaction between jammers and UWASN nodes as a
jamming game; the authors provide closed-form expressions
for the Nash equilibrium when all the underwater channels are
known. For the dynamic/uncertain underwater environments
(when channels are not known), Xiao et al. [15] utilizes a
reinforcement learning-based power control scheme to prevent
the jamming attacks.
The works in [16], [17] consider passive eavesdropping
attacks by a malicious node Eve. In [16], authors consider a
2-D region (a disk) which consists of multiple UWASN nodes
(and one Eve node) distributed according to a Poisson point
process. The authors then utilize tools from stochastic geome-
try to compute the probability that the eavesdropper is able to
intercept the communication ongoing within the network, and
show that the probability of interception decreases as more and
more legitimate nodes fall outside the critical region around
the Eve. [17] considers a one-way, secure communication
problem where a node Alice transmits to another node Bob
(in the presence of an Eve node); Huang et al. [17] propose
that the Bob node exploits the block transmissions nature
and large propagation delays of the acoustic channel to send
out a jamming signal which interferes with the Alice’s signal
received at Eve, thus maximizing the secrecy capacity of the
acoustic channel.
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Fig. 1: An illustration of the system model using an example
topology with M = 10 sensor nodes, and an Eve node.
The works in [18], [19] study the problem of shared secret
keys generation between a legitimate node pair by exploiting
the physical-layer characteristics of the acoustic channel. To
this end, Liu et al. [18] exploit the amplitude (i.e., received
signal strength) of (reciprocal) time-varying, multipath, acous-
tic channel as the source of common randomness, followed
by a fuzzy information reconciliation system (to remove the
inconsistencies between the keys generated by the two nodes).
Huang et al. [19], on the other hand, exploit the channel
frequency response of the acoustic channel to generate the
shared secret keys. [20] proposes SenseVault, a three-tier au-
thentication framework to systematically generate (and update)
cryptographic hash-based secret keys to authenticate the inter-
cluster and intra-cluster UWASN nodes.
In short, to the best of authors’ knowledge, the problem of
impersonation detection in UWASNs has not been reported
in the literature yet. On a side note, many experimental
works have been reported in the literature on wireless sensor
networks which attempt to do border surveillance and intrusion
detection by deploying sensor nodes either over-the-ground or
underwater, along the border (see the survey article [21]). We
note, however, that the works summarized in [21] address the
problem of an aggressive intruder (who is not interested to
hide itself), while this work considers the scenario of a clever
impersonator who aims to inject false data into the system
while staying undetected.
III. SYSTEM MODEL & CHANNEL MODEL
A. System Model
We consider a UWASN comprising M legitimate underwa-
ter sensor nodes (the so-called Alice nodes {Ai}Mi=1) which
report their sensed data to a sink node on the water surface (see
Fig. 1). The sensor nodes are deployed randomly (according
to uniform distribution) on a vertical half-disc (the so-called
trusted zone) according to a 2D geometry. All the nodes in
the considered system model constitute one collision domain,
i.e. the UWASN under consideration is a single-hop system
whereby each sensor (Alice) node could send its sensed data
directly to the sink node. The shared reporting channel is
time-slotted; the sensor nodes access the reporting channel
in a TDMA fashion (and thus, there are no collisions). The
ongoing communication on the reporting channel is at risk of
impersonation attack by a malicious node Eve present nearby.
This work considers an attack scenario whereby the Eve is
in active (but stealth) mode, i.e., Eve attempts to impersonate
some sensor (Alice) node before the sink node so as to inject
some malicious data into the system. We further assume the
following: A1) All the nodes (M legitimate nodes, the sink
node as well as the impersonator Eve) are stationary; A2) Eve
faithfully follows the communication protocol dictated by the
sink node (to be described in the next section) in order to
stay undetected; A3) The shared reporting UWA channel is
memoryless2 (i.e., multipath is negligible); A4) The positions
of the legitimate nodes {Ai}Mi=1 are known to the sink node
in advance3.
B. The UWA Channel with Colored Noise and Frequency-
dependent Pathloss
Two main attributes of the UWA channel degrading
the performance of UWASNs are colored ambient noise,
and frequency-dependent pathloss. Denote by PL(d, f) the
frequency-dependent pathloss between a transmit acoustic
device and a receive acoustic device separated by distance
d, and operating on frequency f . Then, PL(d, f) is given (in
dB scale) as [24]:
PL(d, f)dB = ν10 log d+ dα(f)dB (1)
where ν is the so-called spreading factor, while α(f) is the
coefficient of absorption, given as [24]:
α(f)dB =
0.11f2
1 + f2
+
44f2
4100 + f2
+ 2.75× 10−4f2 + 0.003
(2)
Let N(f) denote the power spectral density (PSD) of the
frequency-dependent ambient noise (comprising of noise con-
tributions from turbulence, shipping, waves, and thermal
noise). Then, N(f) is given (in dB scale) as [24]:
N(f)dB ≈ N1 − ζ10 log f (3)
where N1 and ζ are the experimental constants. Note that the
above approximation of the PSD N(f) of ambient noise holds
for frequency range (1− 100) kHz only [24].
IV. IMPERSONATION DETECTION AND TRANSMITTER
IDENTIFICATION IN AWGN UWA CHANNEL
As briefly explained earlier, impersonation detection is a
systematic framework to verify (at the physical layer) the
identity of the sender node so as to detect-then-reject the
data coming from the (stealth) impersonator node in order
2One example scenario of a memoryless channel is when the UWASN is
deployed in deep waters, and the shared reporting channel has a small range-
to-depth ratio (and thus a small range). Furthermore, the reporting channel is
narrow-band (and thus low-rate), and vertical (and thus multipath reflections
are negligible). This reporting channel then acts as a line-of-sight link which
is noise-limited only [22], [23].
3This is inline with the previous literature on impersonation attack detection
at the physical layer [5], [31].
4to maintain data integrity of the system. For this section, we
make the following additional assumptions: B1) The shared
reporting UWA channel is AWGN4; B2) The noisy estimates
of the distance and AoA (and thus, position) of the channel
occupant are available at the sink node5. Note that both
assumptions B1), B2) are relaxed in the next section where we
obtain an explicit ML distance estimate and the corresponding
CRB to carry out (distance-based) impersonation detection in
a UWA channel with colored noise and frequency-dependent
pathloss.
The proposed method consists of two steps, which work
together to carry out impersonation detection and transmitter
identification. The first (second) step works under the assump-
tion that the Eve node is outside (inside) the so-called trusted
zone. The first step consists of a distance bounding test, while
the second step consists of three outlier detection tests.
A. Step 1: Distance-bounding test
This step is inspired by the proximity-based authentication
techniques (which trust those transmit nodes only that are
in the close proximity) in the radio-frequency identification
systems [30], and the works on border intrusion detection [21].
This step assumes that Eve, being a clever impersonator, wants
to remain undetected; therefore, it remains outside the trusted
zone. As otherwise, if Eve enters the trusted zone, it might be
detected by the system due to the on-board proximity sensors
of the Alice node(s) [21].
The trusted zone. As a first layer of defense against the
potential intrusion, the system relies upon the so-called trusted
zone, a pre-defined geographic region around the sink node
(i.e., a virtual fence). Specifically, this work considers a trusted
zone which is a half-disc6 of radius d0 when the sink node is
placed at the origin (see Fig. 1). Under step 1, all the nodes
inside the trusted zone (the half-disc) are considered to be
legitimate nodes, while all the nodes outside the trusted zone
are considered to be malicious/other nodes.
The distance-bounding protocol. Whenever the sink node
receives some data on the shared reporting channel, it has
to authenticate the sender of the data. As for the step 1, the
sink node needs to estimate whether the sender node is inside
the trusted zone or outside it. To this end, this work exploits
the distance bounding protocol which works as follows. In
the beginning of every time-slot, the sink node broadcasts a
“challenge message” (see Fig. 2) which serves two purposes:
i) it announces the beginning of the current time-slot to all
the UWASN nodes, ii) it asks the channel claimant of the
upcoming time-slot to prove its identity via transmission of a
“response message”. This two-way communication constitutes
the challenge-response based distance-bounding protocol [30].
Specifically, each challenge message from the sink node con-
tains a (different) pseudo-noise (PN) sequence. The channel
4That is, the colored noise inherent to the system has been transformed into
white noise by means of a pre-whitening filter at the sink node [25].
5For example, the distance could be estimated using two-way ranging based
localization schemes [26], [27], [28], while the work [29] (and other works
by the same authors) describes various ways to estimate the AoA.
6The trusted zone is a half-disc because under the distance bounding
protocol, the sink node trusts the transmissions from the sender nodes which
are less than d0 distance away and vice versa.
Slot K-1 Slot K Slot K+1
Challenge Response Sensed DataTs
t0 t1
Fig. 2: Timeline of the TDMA reporting UWA channel
claimant node is required to echo back the PN sequence (after
a delay of Ts) by putting it in its response message7.
Distance as transmit device fingerprint. Under distance-
bounding protocol, the sink node needs to estimate the distance
of the channel claimant from itself during every time-slot.
To this end, the sink node obtains the distance estimate via
(the challenge-response based) two-way ranging method. That
is, the sink node marks the time instant t0 of beginning
of the challenge message; and a while later, estimates the
time of arrival (ToA) t1 of the received response message
by correlating the received noisy PN sequence against the
stored copy of the same PN sequence, and marking the time
instant where the correlation is maximum. The sink node then
translates the estimate of the round-trip time (RTT) t1− t0 to
a distance estimate as v(t1−t0) where v is the speed of sound
wave underwater.
Test 1: The distance bounding test. During the k-th time-
slot, after computing the unbiased distance estimate z(k) = dˆ,
the sink node implements the test 1 as the following binary
hypothesis test:
{
H0(sender is in trusted zone) : z(k) = di + nd(k)
H1(sender is in untrusted zone) : z(k) = dE + nd(k)
(4)
where di (dE) is the distance of the Ai (Eve) node from
the sink node, and nd ∼ N (0, σ2d) is the estimation error.
Since all the Alice nodes are deployed within the trusted zone,
the binary hypothesis (BH) test in Eq. (4) translates to the
following test:
z(k) ≷H1H0 d0 (5)
The test 1 depicted in Eq. (5) approves the transmission from
a sender node if the sender node is less than d0 distance away
from the sink node and vice versa.
Performance of the test 1. The BH test of Eq. (5) will incur
two kinds of errors: false alarm (i.e., misclassifying some Ai
as Eve), and missed detection (i.e., misclassifying Eve as some
Ai). The probabilities for the both error events are as follows.
The probability of false alarm is given as:
7Ts arises due to hardware limitations of a wireless/acoustic device to
switch from receive mode to transmit mode. In this work, the sink node pre-
broadcasts a value for Ts (larger than the typical switching delays), which
the channel claimant must abide by.
5Pfa =
M∑
i=1
Pr(z(k) > d0|Ai)pi(i) (6)
where z(k)|Ai ∼ N (di, σ2d); pi(i) is the prior probability that
the i-th Alice node Ai becomes the channel occupant during
the k-th time-slot. This work considers the case of equal priors,
i.e., pi(i) = 1(M+1) . Then,
Pfa =
1
(M + 1)
M∑
i=1
Q(
d0 − di
σd
) (7)
where Q(x) =
∫∞
x
e
−t2
2√
2pi
dt is the standard Q-function.
Next, the probability of missed detection (the success rate
of Eve) is given as:
Pmd = Pr(z(k) < d0|E)pi(E) (8)
where z(k)|E ∼ N (dE , σ2d); pi(E) is the prior probability
that Eve node becomes the channel occupant during the k-
th time-slot. Since Pmd is a random variable (RV) (because
the unknown distance dE is an RV), we compute its expected
value P¯md := E(Pmd) as follows:
P¯md =
1
(M + 1)
(
1−
∫ kd0
d0+
η Q(
d0 − dE
σd
)ddE
)
(9)
where we have assumed that dE ∼ U(d0 + , kd0);  > 0 is a
small number and k > 1, and η = 1d0(k−1)− is the probability
density function (PDF) of dE .
Remark 1. Despite its simplicity, the main strength of the
distance-bounding protocol is that Eve cannot deceive the sink
node by making her believe that Eve is a trusted node which
lies inside the trusted zone. This is because Eve cannot tamper
with the speed of acoustic waves underwater to make dE
appear lesser than d0 before the sink node. On the other hand,
Eve could indeed make dE appear greater than d0 by delaying
the response message (beyond the value Ts suggested by the
protocol, see Fig. 2). It is noted, however, that such tampering
will not favor Eve, as the sole intent of distance bounding
protocol is to reject network access requests (and/or data) from
the transmit nodes that are > d0 distance away. On a different
note, if Eve tries to send a response message (containing the
malicious payload) before the challenge message is sent by
the sink node, Eve will be detected due to two reasons: i)
Eve’s transmission could collide with the transmission of some
(scheduled) Alice node from the previous slot; ii) Eve does
not know the PN sequence the sink node has sent in its latest
challenge message.
B. Step 2: Outlier detection tests
This step addresses the scenario when Eve is potentially
present within the trusted zone (e.g., because the on-board
proximity sensors of the nearby Alice node(s) within the
trusted zone were defunct). In such situation, step 1 fails to
detect any impersonation attack. Therefore, (as the second
layer of defense) the sink node implements the step 2, which
utilizes the AoA and position as additional device fingerprints.
AoA and Position as transmit device fingerprints. When
Eve is inside the trusted zone, the distance alone ceases to
be effective as the fingerprint of the transmit node(s). This
is because in this case P (|di − dE | < ξ) > 0 for some i,
i = 1, ...,M (ξ is a small number). Therefore, to resolve
the situation when dE is very similar to di (for some i), this
step incorporates the AoA as an additional fingerprint of the
transmit device. Let
y(k) = θˆ(k) = θ + nθ(k) (10)
where y(k) represents the AoA measurement during the
k-th time-slot; θ is the true AoA of the transmit node8;
nθ(k) ∼ N (0, σ2θ) is the estimation error9. Then, pˆ(k) =
z(k) exp (jy(k)) is the (derived) position estimate of the
transmit node, obtained by the sink node during the k-th time-
slot. In other words, the sink node performs a ranging-based
source localization [28] and then the location estimate is used
as fingerprint of the transmit device.
This work assumes that the positions of the legitimate nodes
(a.k.a the ground truth) are known to the sink node in advance.
In other words, d = {d1, ..., dM}T , Θ = {θ1, ..., θM}T ; and
therefore, p = {p1, ..., pM}T (where pi = di exp (jθi)) are
available at the sink node. Then, for each of three fingerprints,
the step 2 consists of an interplay between two kinds of sub-
tests: a maximum likelihood (ML) hypothesis test followed
by another BH test. As a by-product, the step 2 enables the
sink node to perform transmitter identification (for the no
impersonation case) as well.
Test 2(a): Position based test. The ML sub-test works as
follows:
i∗p = arg max
1≤i≤M
fPˆ |Ai(pˆ(k)) (11)
where fPˆ |Ai is the PDF of Pˆ |Ai. Essentially, the ML test
returns the index i∗p that maximizes the likelihood value fPˆ |A∗i ,
given the noisy observation pˆ(k). However, we note that the
closed-form expression for the pdf fPˆ |Ai ∀i is hard to derive.
Therefore, we propose an alternative (sub-optimal) approach,
the nearest-neighbour test. Let:
(J∗, i∗p) = min
i
||pˆ(k)− pi||2 (12)
Note that due to lack of prior knowledge about pE (the
position of Eve), the ML test only solves the transmitter
identification problem (for Alice nodes, for the no imperson-
ation case). For impersonation detection, one needs to define
another binary hypothesis test which works as follows: if
min
i
||pˆ(k) − pi||2 > p, then outlier/Eve is detected; else, Ai
from the ML test is declared to be the sender of the data (p is
a small threshold, a design parameter). Equivalently, the BH
sub-test is:
8Assuming that the uniform linear array (ULA) of hydrophones at the sink
node is horizontally placed on the water surface (along the positive x-axis),
the AoA is the angle made by a sensor node from positive x-axis in counter
clockwise direction (see Fig. 3).
9 [29] describes various methods to estimate the AoA in UWASNs.
6H0(no impersonation) : J
∗ = min
i
||pˆ(k)− pi||2 < p
H1(impersonation) : J∗ = min
i
||pˆ(k)− pi||2 > p
(13)
The BH test in Eq. (13) can be re-written as:
J∗ ≷H1H0 p (14)
The test in Eq. (14) approves the transmission from a sender
node only if the position estimate pˆ(k) of the sender node lies
within the ball (around some point pi, i = 1, ...,M ) of radius
p and vice versa.
Test 2(b): Distance based test. The ML (equivalently, the
nearest-neighbour) sub-test works as follows:
(K∗, i∗d) = min
i
|z − di| (15)
Next, the BH sub-test works as follows:
K∗ ≷H1H0 d (16)
where d is a small threshold, a design parameter.
Test 2(c): AoA based test. The ML sub-test works as
follows:
(L∗, i∗θ) = min
i
|y − θi| (17)
Next, the BH sub-test works as follows:
L∗ ≷H1H0 θ (18)
where θ is a small threshold, a design parameter.
Remark 2. The closed-form expressions for the two error
probabilities (i.e., Pfa and Pmd) could not be derived for
the test 2(a) since the PDF of the test statistic J∗ in Eq.
(14) is not straightforward to obtain. However, Section VI
shares extensive simulation results which shed light on the
performance of the tests 2(a), 2(b), 2(c) as well as the fusion
rules (discussed below).
Performance of test 2(b). The two error probabilities for
test 2(b) are:
P
(d)
fa = P (K
∗ > d|H0)
=
1
(M + 1)
M∑
i=1
2Q(
d
σd
) =
2M
(M + 1)
Q(
d
σd
)
(19)
and P¯ (d)md := E(P
(d)
md) is as follows:
P¯
(d)
md = E(P (K
∗ < d|H1))
=
1
(M + 1)(kd0 − dmin) .(∫ kd0
dmin
M∑
i=1
Q(
di − d − dE
σd
)−Q(di + d − dE
σd
)ddE
)
(20)
where we have assumed that the unknown distance dE ∼
U(dmin, kd0).
The expressions for P (θ)fa and P
(θ)
md for test 2(c) could be
obtained in a similar way; and therefore, are omitted for the
sake of brevity.
Uniform Linear Array
𝜃
𝜖ఏ
𝜖ௗ
True AoA
𝐴i node
Fig. 3: The proximity regions of the three tests in step 2 (The
sink node is shown to be equipped with a ULA containing
three hydrophones.)
Remark 3. Each of the tests 2(a), 2(b) & 2(c) checks
whether or not the noisy measurement of sender’s fingerprint
is within the so-called proximity region (PR) of any of the
legitimate (Alice) nodes and decides accordingly. The PR, by
definition, is a small region around the true value of each
fingerprint, which represents the estimation errors. The PR is
a half-ring (of width 2d meters) for the distance test, a cone
(of width 2θ degrees) for the AoA test, and a circle (of radius
p square meters) for the position test (see Fig. 3). As Section
VI will demonstrate, various levels of performance could be
obtained by varying the size of the PR (or, equivalently, by
varying the comparison thresholds p, d & θ).
C. Impersonation Detection
To detect the potential impersonation, first the individual
binary decisions—impersonation or no impersonation—of all
the three tests in the second step are fused together. Then, the
fusion outcome is further fused with the binary decision from
the first step to generate the ultimate binary decision.
The decision fusion of tests 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c). The
individual decisions of tests 2(a), 2(b), 2(c) are fused via
i) AND rule, ii) OR rule, iii) majority voting (MV) rule.
Specifically, the AND (OR) rule is pessimistic (optimistic),
i.e., a sender node is authenticated only if all (any one out
of) the three tests decide H0. The AND (OR) rule strives to
minimize Pmd (Pfa).
The decision fusion of step 1 and step 2. When Eve is
inside the trusted zone, step 1 is not helpful; therefore, only the
outcome of step 2 should count to decide about the potential
impersonation. On the other hand, when Eve is outside the
trusted zone, the outcome of step 1 is equally helpful. To take
into account both situations, this work applies the (pessimistic)
AND rule to fuse the individual decisions made by step 1 &
step 2 (which minimizes the ultimate probability of missed
detection even further).
D. Transmitter Identification
When both steps (step 1 and step 2) declare H0, i.e., no
impersonation, then i∗ = MV (i∗p, i
∗
d, i
∗
θ) works as the transmit
7identifier. In this situation, the probability of misclassification
error is given as:
Pe =
M∑
i=1
Pe|ipi(i) (21)
where Pe|i = P (sink decides Aj |Ai was the sender). For the
distance based test (test 2(b)), Pe|i is given as:
P
(d)
e|i = 1−
(
Q(
d˜l,i − d˜i
σd
)−Q( d˜u,i − d˜i
σd
)
)
(22)
where d˜l,i =
d˜i−1+d˜i
2 , d˜u,i =
d˜i+d˜i+1
2 . Additionally, d˜ =
{d˜1, ..., d˜M} = sort(d) where sort(.) operation sorts a vector
in an increasing order. For the boundary cases, e.g., i = 1, i =
M , d˜l,1 = dmin, d˜l,M = d0 respectively.
A similar expression exists for the misclassification error
P
(θ)
e|i for the AoA-based test (test 2(c)) which is omitted for
the sake of brevity.
The algorithmic implementation of the proposed method
has been summarized in Algorithm 1, while Fig. 4 provides a
graphical summary.
Algorithm 1: The proposed method for Impersonation
detection & Transmitter identification
Input : pˆ(k) = z(k) exp (jy(k))
Output : b, i∗ // i∗ is the index of the sender node;
b = 1 (b = 0) implies (no) impersonation.
Parameters: p, d, Θ, d0, p, d, θ, k
1 Step 1: Distance bounding test:
2 implement the BH test in Eq. (5) and return binary
decision
3 Step 2: Outlier detection tests:
4 implement the ML tests in Eq. (12), Eq. (15), Eq. (17) to
return J∗,K∗, L∗ and i∗p, i
∗
d, i
∗
θ
5 implement the BH tests in Eq. (14), Eq. (16), Eq. (18) to
return binary decisions for each test
6 Fusion of tests in step 2:
7 apply AND, OR, MV rules to fuse the individual
decisions by tests in Eq. (14), Eq. (16), Eq. (18)
8 Impersonation detection:
9 apply AND rule to fuse the binary decisions by step 1
and step 2
10 Transmitter identification:
11 apply MV rule on i∗p, i
∗
d, i
∗
θ to return the index i
∗ when
H0 is decided
V. IMPERSONATION DETECTION AND TRANSMITTER
IDENTIFICATION IN UWA CHANNEL WITH COLORED
NOISE AND FREQUENCY-DEPENDENT PATHLOSS
In this section, we first derive an explicit ML distance
estimate and the corresponding CRB in a UWA channel with
colored noise and frequency-dependent pathloss to relax the
assumptions B1) and B2) made earlier in Section IV. We
then carry out a single-feature (distance) based impersonation
detection and transmitter identification by invoking Test 1 and
Test 2(b) from Algorithm 1 proposed in Section IV.
𝑖𝑑
∗
Distance 
bounding 
test Eq. (5)
Test 2a: 
Position test
Test 2b: 
Distance test
Test 2c: 
AoA test
Decision fusion (AND, OR, MV)
Decision fusion (AND)
ML test Eq. (12) 
BH test Eq. (14) 
ML test Eq. (15) 
BH test Eq. (16)
ML test  Eq. (17)
BH test Eq. (18) 
Step1
Step 2
Input:  𝑝(𝑘)
1/0
1/01/0
1/01/01/0
ifDecision fusion (MV)
𝑖𝑝
∗ 𝑖𝑑
∗ 𝑖𝜃
∗
10
Impersonation
𝑖𝑝
∗ 𝑖𝑑
∗ 𝑖𝜃
∗
𝑖∗
No Impersonation
Fig. 4: The flow chart of the proposed method for Imperson-
ation detection & Transmitter identification
A. Round-Trip Time/ToA based Distance Estimation
For a (colored) noise-limited, line-of-sight UWA channel
that is exposed to frequency-dependent pathloss, the signal
y(t) received at the sink node is given as: y(t) =
√
PRs(t−
t1) + w(t) where s(t) is the response message sent by
channel claimant, and t1 is the ToA to be estimated. w(t)
is the stationary Gaussian colored noise process with auto-
correlation functionRw(τ) = F−1{N(f)} with lag parameter
τ ; F−1{.} is the inverse Fourier transform operator; N(f)
is the PSD of the colored noise defined in Eq. (3). Finally,√
PR =
√
PT
PL where PL is the pathloss given in Eq. (1), and
PT is the fixed transmit power used by the channel claimant.
The equivalent discrete-time model for the signal received
at the sink node is: y(nTS) = y[n] =
√
PRs[n − t1] + w[n]
where y[n] is the output of the receive filter, and TS ≤ Tb/2 (to
avoid aliasing) is the sampling interval; Tb is the bit duration.
We assume that the sink node collects Q samples during one
slot. Then we can write: y = s + w where y = {y[n]}Qn=1,
s = {√PRs[n − t1]}Qn=1, and w = {w[n]}Qn=1. Then,
under maximum likelihood (ML) estimation framework, the
ToA estimate is the one which maximizes the (log of) joint
(conditional) density:
tˆ1 = arg max
t1
log fy(y|t1) = arg max
t1
L(y; t1)
= arg max
t1
log
1
(2pi)Q/2|C|1/2 exp (−
1
2
(y − s)TC−1(y − s))
= arg max
t1
[
− log (2pi)Q/2|C|1/2 − 1
2
(y − s)TC−1(y − s)
]
(23)
where C = E{wwT } is Q × Q covariance matrix of w,
and |.| represents the determinant of a matrix. Note that w ∼
N (0,C) where 0 is the vector (of appropriate size) of all
zeros; [C]i,j = σ2[Cˇ]i,j where [Cˇ]i,j = Rw(τ = |i−j|TS) =
Rw[|i − j|], 0 ≤ [Cˇ]i,j ≤ 1; [Cˇ]i,i = Rw(0) = 1 ∀ i, j =
1, .., Q.
8Discarding the irrelevant terms and rearranging, we have:
tˆ1 = arg max
t1
L(y; t1) = arg min
t1
(y−s(t1))TC−1(y−s(t1))
(24)
where the notation s(t1) is used to highlight the dependence of
s on t1. Eq. (24) is indeed a matched filtering operation where
that t1 is chosen which maximizes (minimizes) the weighted
inner product 〈y, s〉C−1 (〈y−s〉C−1 ) where 〈a,b〉D = aTDb.
In other words, the ML delay/ToA estimator block is simply a
matched filter, or, the PN sequence correlator (which compares
the received noisy signal against the delayed copies of the pre-
stored clean PN sequence s[n]).
One can verify that ∂L(y;t1)∂t1 = 2s˙
TC−1(y − s) where
s˙ =
√
PR
∂
∂t1
{s[n − t1]}Qn=1. Setting ∂L(y;t1)∂t1 = 0, we get a
transcendental equation. Therefore, no closed-form expression
exists for ML estimate of t1, and we resort to Eq. (24) to
compute tˆ1 via exhaustive search by plugging Q values of t1,
i.e., t1 ∈ {n0, ..., n0 +Q−1} (we take n0 = 1 here). For this,
PR is estimated as: PˆR = 1Q
∑Q
n=1(y[n])
2.
Also, one can verify that: ∂
2L(y;t1)
∂2t1
= −4(s˙TC−1s˙ +
s¨TC−1(y − s)), where s¨ = √PR ∂2∂2t1 {s[n − t1]}
Q
n=1. With
this, the Cramer-Rao bound (CRB) for the ToA estimate is
obtained as:
Var(tˆ1) ≥ CRB(tˆ1) = − 1
E[∂
2L(y;t1)
∂2t1
]
=
1
E[(∂L(y;t1)∂t1 )
2]
=
σ2
4PRs˙T Cˇ−1s˙
=
σ2PL
4PT s˙T Cˇ−1s˙
(25)
Since the proposed ML estimate satisfies regulatory conditions
on L(y; t1) (i.e., the first two derivatives of L(y; t1) w.r.t. t1
exist, and Fisher information I(t1) = −E[∂
2L(y;t1)
∂2t1
] is non-
zero); therefore, (for large Q) it is asymptotically optimal,
unbiased and Gaussian. In other words, tˆ1
a∼ N (t1, I(t1)−1).
Thus, tˆ1 is efficient, i.e., it meets the CRB.
Having estimated the ToA t1, the sink node then computes
an estimate of the round-trip time (RTT) as follows: ∆̂t =
tˆ1−t0. Equivalently, ∆̂t = ∆̂tp+Ts, where Ts is the switching
delay, and ∆̂tp is the RTT with zero switching delay. With this,
the sink node obtains the following distance estimate:
z = dˆ = v
∆̂tp
2
=
v
2
tˆ1 − v
2
(t0 + Ts) (26)
where v = 1500 m/sec is the (constant) speed of the acoustic
waves underwater. Therefore, z = dˆ ∼ N (d, σ2d), where σ2d =
σ2v2PL
16PT s˙T Cˇ−1s˙
. Let SNR= 1/σ2. Then,
σ2d =
v2PL
16SNRPT s˙T Cˇ−1s˙
(27)
Remark 4. The RTT-based distance estimation under the
distance bounding protocol is commonly known as two-way
ranging-based localization in the literature. We note that
the two-way ranging-based localization schemes are (time)
synchronization-free [26], [27], [28]. In other words, RTT es-
timation only requires two timestamps t0 and t1 generated by
the local oscillator/clock of the sink node; therefore, no explicit
time synchronization among the UWASN nodes is needed.
Nevertheless, we emphasize that the periodic broadcast of
the challenge message by the sink node implicitly enables
(coarse) time synchronization in the network. This is because
the UWASN nodes then follow a master-slave architecture
where the sink node acts as the master node, while the sensor
nodes act as the slave nodes.
B. Performance of Distance based Impersonation Detection
and Transmitter Identification
Test 1 (distance bounding test) first. Let σ2di =
v2PLi
16SNRPT s˙T Cˇ−1s˙
where PLi is the distance-dependent pathloss
incurred by the transmission by Ai. Also, let σ2dE =
v2PLE
16SNRPT s˙T Cˇ−1s˙
where PLE is the distance-dependent pathloss
incurred by the transmission by Eve. Then, the probability of
false alarm Pfa is obtained by replacing σd in Eq. (7) with σdi ,
while the probability of missed detection Pmd is obtained by
replacing σd in Eq. (9) with σdE . Note that σdE is a one-on-one
function of dE ; therefore, everything else in Eq. (9) remains
intact. Next, the Test 2(b). The Pfa is obtained by replacing
σd with σdi in Eq. (19). The Pmd is obtained by replacing σd
with σdE in Eq. (20). Finally, the transmitter identification. The
probability of misclassification Pmc is obtained by replacing
σd with σdi in Eq. (22).
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first describe our simulation setup, and
then present the simulation results which quantify the perfor-
mance of the proposed impersonation detection framework for
the AWGN UWA channel, and the UWA channel with colored
noise and frequency-dependent pathloss.
A. Simulation Setup
The performance evaluation was done in MATLAB. We
consider a UWASN whose sensor (Alice) nodes are deployed
in deep waters; and therefore, the reporting UWA channel
is near-vertical (and thus, multipath-free). Fig. 5 shows the
details of our simulation setup. The sink node is placed on the
water surface at (0,0), while a trusted zone, in the shape of a
vertical half-disc, of radius d0 = 500 m is constructed around
it (d0 is set to 500 m to realize a UWASN in deep waters).
M = 10 Alice nodes are deployed according to uniform
distribution within the trusted zone. One Eve node is present
which is randomly placed either outside the trusted zone, or,
inside it (see Fig. 5). The SNR at the sink node is defined
as 1/σ2. For the AWGN UWA channel, we further assume
that σ2d = σ
2
θ = σ
2
p = σ
2 is the common estimation error
corrupting the measurements of distance, AoA and position
at the sink node10. Such simplistic definition of SNR allows
us to compare the performance of the various hypothesis tests
and fusion rules proposed in Algorithm 1 against each other.
On the other hand, for the UWA channel with colored noise
10For simplicity of exposition, we assume that a mechanism to measure all
the three features/fingerprints (i.e., distance, AoA and position) with the same
quality exists. Furthermore, SNR as defined here does not represent quality
of the underlying underwater UWA reporting channel; it rather is an indicator
of the quality of a measurement.
9(a) For step 1, the Eve node is randomly placed outside the trusted
zone, but within one of three half-discs (of radius kd0 where k > 1),
one by one.
(b) For step 2, Eve is randomly placed at two different locations inside
the trusted zone (where one location is close to, and other location is
away from, the boundary of the trusted zone).
(c) To demonstrate the strength of position based test (the test 2(c)),
two worst case scenarios are considered where Eve node is strategically
placed at two locations which culminate in either distance, or, AoA
ceasing to be effective as the fingerprint of the sender node.
Fig. 5: Simulation Setup
(with covariance matrix C = σ2Cˇ) and frequency-dependent
pathloss PL(d, f), σ2d =
(
v2PL(d,f)
16PT s˙T Cˇ−1s˙
)
σ2.
B. Simulation Results: AWGN UWA Channel
Fig. 6 investigates the impersonation detection performance
of step 1, Figs. 7, 8, 9 together investigate the impersonation
detection performance of step 2, while Fig. 10 investigates the
transmitter identification performance of step 2, for the AWGN
UWA channel.
Fig. 6 plots the impersonation detection performance of
step 1 (the distance bounding test). To obtain the results in
Fig. 6, Eve is randomly placed at three different locations
outside the trusted zone (see Fig. 5 (a)). Specifically, Fig. 6
sketches the tradeoff of the two error probabilities (Pmd, Pfa)
against the SNR whereby both Pmd & Pfa decrease with an
increase in SNR. However, since the centroid of the Alice
nodes’ positions (for the deployment shown in Fig. 5) is away
from the boundary of the trusted zone, Pfa vanishes (to zero)
much faster with an increase in SNR.
Fig. 7 studies the decay rate of the success probability of
Eve (Pmd) as a function of SNR. To obtain the results in Fig.
7, Eve is randomly placed at two different locations within
the trusted zone (see Fig. 5 (b)). As anticipated, the AND
(OR) rule being a pessimistic (optimistic) rule performs the
best (worst). More precisely, for any given SNR, the AND
(OR) rule minimizes (maximizes) the Pmd; equivalently, for
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Fig. 6: Impersonation detection performance of step 1: Eve
is placed outside the trusted zone (as depicted in Fig. 5 (a)).
Both classification errors approach zero exponentially as the
SNR is increased.
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Fig. 7: Impersonation detection performance of step 2: Eve is
placed at two locations inside the trusted zone (as depicted
in Fig. 5 (b)); PR stands for proximity region; for PR1, p =
1m2, d = 1m, θ = 1◦; for PR2, p = 3m2, d = 3m,
θ = 3
◦. The success probability of Eve vanishes as the SNR
is increased.
any given requirement on Pmd, the AND (OR) rule requires
much lesser (higher) SNR compared to the other schemes.
Additionally, the performance of the Position test is identical
to that of AND rule (this is because the position/location,
by definition, is the AND/combining of distance and AoA).
Lastly, increasing the area of the proximity region for each of
the tests 2(a), 2(b), 2(c) results in degradation of the detection
performance of step 2.
Fig. 8 plots the probability of false alarm Pfa (an indicator
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Fig. 8: Impersonation detection performance of step 2: Eve is
placed inside the trusted zone; for PR1, p = 1m2, d = 1m,
θ = 1
◦; for PR2, p = 3m2, d = 3m, θ = 3◦. The false
alarm rate vanishes to zero with an increase in the SNR.
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Fig. 9: Worst-case impersonation detection performance of
step 2: Eve is strategically placed at two locations inside the
trusted zone (as depicted in Fig. 5 (c)); for PR1, p = 1
m2, d = 1 m, θ = 1◦; for PR2, p = 3 m2, d = 3 m,
θ = 3
◦. For each of the two positions of Eve, either distance
or AoA ceases to be effective as device fingerprint as its missed
detection rate approaches one at high SNR values; however,
location remains effective as fingerprint as its missed detection
rate approaches zero at high SNRs.
of data rate shrinkage)11 as a function of SNR. Once again,
the OR (AND) rule performs the best (worst) as anticipated.
This is because the OR (AND) rule, by definition, minimizes
(maximizes) the probability of false alarm. Furthermore, the
performance of the Position test (test 2(a)) coincides with the
performance of the AND rule. Finally, increasing the area
of the proximity region for each of the tests 2(a), 2(b), 2(c)
results in reduction in the probability of data rate shrinkage,
as expected.
Fig. 9 captures the so-called worst case scenarios for test
2 whereby some individual (specifically, the weaker one)
fingerprints collapse. Specifically, the first worst case scenario
considers the situation where |θE − θi| < θ indefinitely
(see Fig. 5 (c)). Therefore, in this situation, AoA ceases
to be effective as the fingerprint of the transmit device. In
such situation, SNR becomes a foe instead of a friend, i.e.,
lim
SNR→∞
P
(AoA)
md = 1 (see the top plot of Fig. 9). Similarly,
the second worst case scenario captures the situation where
|dE−di| < d indefinitely (see Fig. 5 (c)) which culminates in
distance being ineffective as fingerprint of the transmit device.
Once again, an increase in SNR makes the situation worse, i.e.,
lim
SNR→∞
P
(d)
md = 1 (see the bottom plot in Fig. 9). However, one
can see that the Position test as well as AND rule gracefully
sustain such worst case scenarios12.
Fig. 10 plots the decay rate of the misclassification error
Pmc (i.e., incorrectly identifying Alice i as Alice j) against
SNR for all the three tests 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), and their fusion
via MV rule. From Fig. 10, one can see that the Position test
outperforms the other two tests (distance based, AoA based) by
a big margin, while the curve for the MV rule is superimposed
on the curve for the Position test. This is expected, because as
explained in Remark 3, the proximity region of the Position
test is much smaller than the proximity regions of the distance
test and the AoA test.
C. Simulation Results: UWA Channel with Colored Noise and
Frequency-dependent Pathloss
Figs. 11, 12, 13 investigate the impersonation detection
performance of step 1, step 2, and transmitter identification
performance of step 2 respectively, for the UWA Channel with
colored noise and frequency-dependent pathloss. For the sake
of fair comparison, we set Cˇ = I, or, C = σ2I to realize an
AWGN UWA channel that is exposed to frequency-dependent
pathloss (I is a Q × Q identity matrix). This AWGN UWA
channel, therefore, is different than the AWGN UWA channel
considered in Section V-B which sees no pathloss. For all the
plots in this sub-section, we set PT = 250 dBµ Pascals.
Fig. 11 plots the two error probabilities of step 1 (the
distance bounding test) against SNR. To our surprise, the
proposed impersonation detection scheme performs better in
UWA channel with colored noise than in AWGN UWA chan-
nel. Additionally, as expected, an increase in Q (i.e., collecting
11False alarm, by definition, is the case when the sink node ends up
discarding the data from the legitimate (Alice) nodes, which results in
reduction in net data rate, increased latency due to re-transmissions, etc.
12The scenario |pE − pi| < p is omitted simply because it implies that
the Eve is co-located with some Ai (assuming that p equals the size of a
typical UWASN node).
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Fig. 10: Transmitter identification performance of step 2: The
misclassification rate reduces to zero with increase in SNR.
(The curve for the MV rule is superimposed on the curve for
the position test).
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Fig. 11: Impersonation detection performance of step 1: Eve
is placed outside the trusted zone (as depicted in Fig. 5
(a)). Both error probabilities reduce to zero with increase in
SNR. Moreover, the performance of step 1 increases as we
collect more samples Q for distance estimation. Finally, the
performance of step 1 is better in UWA channel with colored
noise than the AWGN UWA channel.
more samples for estimation during a slot) culminates in better
performance (due to better distance estimate). Last but not the
least, for both channels (AWGN UWA, and UWA with colored
noise), the threshold SNR to achieve arbitrarily small errors
for the probability of false alarm is about 5 dB lower than the
probability of missed detection.
Fig. 12 studies the impersonation detection performance of
step 2 (test 2(b)) as a function of SNR. We once again notice
that an increase in Q (reduces both kind of errors at any
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Fig. 12: Impersonation detection performance of step 2: Eve
is placed inside the trusted zone; for PR1, d = 1m; for PR2,
d = 3m. Both error probabilities reduce to zero with increase
in SNR. Additionally, increasing the area of the proximity
region results in degradation in detection performance of step
2. Finally, the threshold SNR to achieve arbitrarily small
errors for Pmd is about 5 dB lower than that for Pfa.
given SNR, and thus) leads to improved performance, and that
the proposed test 2(b) performs better in the face of colored
noise. We also note that increasing the area of the proximity
region for the test 2(b) results in degradation of the detection
performance of test 2(b). Finally, for step 2, the probability of
missed detection drops to zero much faster than the probability
of false alarm. That is, the threshold SNR to achieve arbitrarily
small errors for Pmd is at least 5 dB lower than Pfa.
Fig. 13 plots the decay rate of the misclassification error
Pmc (i.e., incorrectly identifying Ai as Aj) against SNR for
test 2(b). This result corroborates our earlier observations
in Figs. 11, 12, i.e., an increase in Q leads to improved
performance, and that the proposed test 2(b) performs better
in the face of colored noise.
D. Discussions
• The results in Figs. 7, 8, 9 indicate that, under the
impersonation detection problem, it is not possible to
minimize both Pmd and Pfa at the same time because
of their conflicting nature. In other words, one could
minimize one error type only by compromising on the
other error type (which is inline with Neyman-Pearson
Theorem [32]).
• To our surprise, Figs. 11, 12, 13 reveal that the proposed
impersonation detection (and transmitter identification)
scheme performs better in UWA channel with colored
noise than in the AWGN UWA channel. Looking at Eq.
(27), we see that only Cˇ changes in going from an
AWGN UWA channel to a UWA channel with colored
noise (while all the other parameters stay the same);
therefore, the behavior observed is mainly due to change
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Fig. 13: Transmitter identification performance of step 2.
The misclassification rate reduces to zero with increase in
SNR. Moreover, the performance increases as we collect more
samples Q for distance estimation. Finally, the performance
is better in UWA channel with colored noise than the AWGN
UWA channel.
in the Frobenius norm of Cˇ−1. In a nutshell, this finding
prompts us to the optimistic conclusion that the proposed
method is indeed effective for a UWA channel with
colored noise and frequency-dependent pathloss.
• This work does not have experimental results to report
to support the simulation results presented earlier. Nev-
ertheless, the reader interested in experimental valida-
tion of the proposed impersonation detection framework
is referred to the works [33]–[35]. Specifically, [33]
summarizes the state-of-the-art in commercial underwa-
ter acoustic modems, while the details pertinent to the
(commercially available) arrays of hydrophones could be
found in [34], [35] which report experimental results.
• Though this work assumes a 2D geometry/deployment
of the UWASN nodes for the sake of clarity of exposi-
tion, extension of the proposed impersonation detection
framework to the case of 3D geometry/deployment of
the UWASN nodes is laborious but straightforward. Yet,
some comments are in order. Under the 3D geometry,
the sink node will have to estimate two angles of arrival,
the azimuth AoA θ and elevation AoA φ in addition to
the distance estimation. For this purpose, the sink node
could utilize a uniform circular array instead of a uniform
linear array. With the distance estimate and the estimates
of the two AoAs available, the sink node could then
uniquely estimate the location/position of the transmit
node as (d, θ, φ) in spherical coordinates. Furthermore,
the additional angle of arrival could serve as an additional
feature. But the overall framework (as summarized in Fig.
4 and Algorithm 1) remains the same as before.
VII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
This work addressed the problem of impersonation attack
detection in a line-of-sight underwater acoustic sensor network
(UWASN), for both additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)-
limited underwater acoustic (UWA) channel, and the UWA
channel with colored noise and frequency-dependent pathloss.
We first proposed a novel, multiple-features based, two-step
method which utilized the distance, the angle of arrival (AoA),
and the location of a sender node as device fingerprints
to carry out the authentication as well as the transmitter
identification, for the AWGN UWA channel. To this end, we
provided closed-form expressions for the error probabilities
(i.e., the performance) of most of the hypothesis tests. We
then considered the case of a UWA with colored noise
and frequency-dependent pathloss, and derived a maximum-
likelihood distance estimator as well as the corresponding
Cramer-Rao bound. We then invoked the proposed two-step,
impersonation detection framework by utilizing distance as
the sole feature. Simulation results verified the feasibility of
the proposed scheme when applied to a UWA channel with
colored noise and frequency-dependent pathloss.
This work opens up many interesting possibilities for future
work. For example, when the Eve and/or Alice nodes are
mobile, a Bayesian filtering framework (such as [31]) could be
employed to track the motion of each mobile sensor node to
keep up with the need of obtaining the updated ground truth
periodically. Additionally, a more general scenario whereby
multiple Eve nodes (with the exact count of Eve nodes not
known a priori) are present need to be studied. Finally,
adapting the proposed method to more complex scenarios, e.g.,
multipath propagation, reverberation, stratification etc., is yet
another promising direction of research.
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